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Social control: analytical tool or analytical quagmire?*
DOROTHY E. CHUNN 1& SHELLEY A.M. GAVIGAN 2
1

School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada; 2 Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada

I find Social Control a key that unlocks many doors.
E. A. Ross
The term 'social control' has lately become something of a Mickey Mouse concept.
S. Cohen

There is probably no concept which is used more widely and with less precision than
that of 'social control' .1 Given the lack of agreement about what 'social control' is,
researchers usually employ the term in one of two ways. Either they assume that its
meaning is obvious and requires no clarification; or, they begin with a perfunctory
acknowledgment of the definitional problems associated with the concept and
proceed to use it anyway. The eclecticism of the latter approach has stimulated
attempts over the years to produce a universally applicable definition of 'social
control' that could be employed both system- atically and scientifically in research
(Clark and Gibbs 1965, Gibbs 1977, Janowitz 1978, Mayer 1983). While these
efforts are commendable and may ultimately prove fruitful, the ongoing elusiveness
of such a formulation has led us in a different direction. We have concluded that
the concept of 'social control' incorporates ambiguities which severely undermine
its effectiveness as an analytical tool. The argument is developed in two stages: first,
by tracing the historical evolution of the concept to illustrate the problematic nature
of a 'social control' model; and second, by demonstrating, through an assessment of
*
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Anthro- pology, 4-7 June 1986, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Equal authorship.

the 'women, law and social control' literature, its inadequacy as an analyt- ical
construct. 2

'Social control' and American sociology; one model fits all

To understand the limitations of the concept of 'social control' requires a brief
discussion of its historical origins and subsequent elaboration. Janowitz (1975: 82,
see also 1976; 1978) points out that the term was first used by the classical
nineteenth-century European theorists to draw a link between sociology and
social philosophy. However, there seems to be express agreement that the selfconscious formulation of 'social control' as an analytical concept and its
utilization in sociological research were the accomplishments of American
academics (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 198-221, Janowitz 1975: 87,
1978: 33, Brown 1978: n.l., Hunt 1978: 19-20, Gibbons 1979, Adlam and Rose
1981, Cohen and Scull 1983: 5-7). Since the 1890s, American sociologists have
formulated two definitions of 'social control' which, although seemingly
contradictory, share a common focus; namely, the question of how social
order is maintained in pluralist democracies, specifically the United States. One
definition is premised on the assumption that societal integration is achieved
through the operation of numerous non-coercive social control pro- cesses; the
other on the belief that coercive state control mechanisms, partic- ularly law,
play the most crucial role in reproducing the status quo (Janowitz 1975, 1978;
Rothman 1981; Cohen 1985).
Both versions of 'social control' have been products of the functionalist and
interactionist strands within American sociology. What might be called the

benign formulation originated in the work of E.A. Ross during his tenure at
Stanford University (Ross 1969: xv; see also Geis 1964, Schwendinger and
Schwendinger 1974); wound its way via the pages of the American Journal of
Sociology into the writings of various Chicago School members (Cooley 1966,
Park andBurgess 1969: c.1, c.12); and from there into the thought and
publications of Talcott Parsons (1951). The basic concern of all these men was to
explain how 'fundamental harmony' and 'cooperation' were being achieved in
America without frequent recourse to or reliance on 'coercion or external
discipline' (Rothman 1981: 11). What they concluded was that informal, noninstitutionalized mechanisms of social control, 'located in primary social
activities', were the key to the maintenance of social order (Hunt 1978: 147).
Thus, social control was viewed primarily 'in terms of the socialisation process
operating through the internalization of values' ( ibid). It is this conception of
'social control' which has surfaced in the work of some contemporary control
theorists (Reckless 1961, Hirschi 1969, Downes and Rock 1982, c.9). 3
The conception of social control as organized repression emerged in the
1960s and 1970s and owed an intellectual debt to the observations of Tannenbaum (1938) and Lemert (1951, 1967) about the deleterious effects of official
stigmatization. The idea that the social control exercised by state agents
produced and reinforced deviance was extensively elaborated and refined by the
neo-Chicagoan labelling theorists of the 1960s and 1970s. During the same
period, radical deviancy theorists (Quinney 1974, Spitzer 1975, Chambliss
1976, Platt 1977) developed macro analyses of the functions served by the
essentially undemocratic and coercive character of the institutions used by 'top dogs'
or ruling classes to impose their will on the exploited underclasses in American

society (Rothman 1981, Cohen 1985). Premised onnotions of coercion and
cooptation, the 'new' version of 'social control' constituted an apparently severe
critique of the existing capitalist social order in the United States. The concept of
'social control' as 'doing good' had become the concept of 'social control' as 'doing
bad'.
It is important to emphasize how tremendously influential the concept of social
control hasbeen amongAnglo-American sociologists of deviance throughout the
twentieth century. Researchers applied the concept in one sphere after another
until it was eventually 'taken for granted' that weak or strong, informal or formal
controls were 'manifest in every single phase of social life' (Schwendinger and
Schwendinger 1974: 203; see also Janowitz 1975, 1978: 39-44). Moreover, both
the benign and coercive definitions of social control have been widely adopted by
academics in other disciplines such as law (Pound 1930, 1942) and history
(Stedman Jones 1977, Pisciotta 1981, Mayer 1983). Thus, to a great extent, the
discourse of North American sociology and that of related disciplines in the
twentieth century has been, and is, the discourse of social control. Functionalists
and interactionists, marxists and non-marxists all employ the concept, many
uncritically, assuming that its meaning is one of the two previously outlined.
But, from the late 1970s, the recognition has spread that 'social control' is an
extremely problematic term. Brown (1978: 126; see also Hay 1978: 107)
describes it as 'an ambiguous concept' which is difficult to use in research
because definitions vary and the range of phenomena to which 'social control' is
applied varies as well. However, despite these acknowledgments, many
academics argue that it would be exceedingly difficult to coin a superior
concept 'to describe the processes by which society is preserved from disruption'; they express optimism that the problems associated with the term 'social

control' can be eliminated through 'clear definition and consistent use of the
concept' (Hay 1978: 108; see also Janowitz 1978, Mayer 1983). Indeed, a number of
sociologists are presently engaged in attempts to formulate system- atic theories of
social control (Davis 1980, Anderson and Davis 1983, Melossi 1985).
However, the hegemony of the concept is not absolute. On the contrary, some
trenchant criticisms of the term have appeared in recent years (Muraskin 1976,
Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974, Stedman Jones 1977, Hall et al. 1978,
Corrigan and Sayer 1981, Hall and Scraton 1981, Rothman 1981). De- spite the
faith of its adherents, therefore, critics have maintained that the concept of 'social
control' suffers from some very serious flaws which stunt its efficacy as an analytical
tool, and provide good reason for its abandonment by critical academics.On the
one hand , they argue that, as an American'invention' and export, the term is
characterized by a certain ethnocentricity and is thus unavoidably encumbered with
the ideological baggage ofliberalism. On the other, they point to the fact that, whether
we are speaking about the benign or coercive formulation of 'social control',
researchers use the concept as if it is a universally applicable one.
What this means, then, is that a 'social control' model is essentially ahistor ical and
determinist. These criticisms are elaborated by Hall et al. (1978: 195) in a short, but
damning, comment which indicts what they call the contemporary 'control-culture'
approach for its lack of focus on historically-specific types of state or political
regime. Thus, the 'social control' model fails to distinguish not only between
different kinds of social formations but also between social formations of the
same general type (for example, market societies). Rather, it suggests either the
natural evolution of informal/formal social controls or the arbitrary imposition of
controls by state agents and agencies. Moreover, although inextricably tied to the
liberal democratic, capitalist social formations of the twentieth century, the

concept of social control as employed by researchers frequently becomes a
determinist one because it is devoid of any theorization of the state. The latter, then,
remains an undifferentiated entity in both the benign and coercive formulations
of 'social control'. In the former, it either assumes the role of neutral arbiter or acts
as an advocate of the 'best interests' of citizens (Ross 1969). In the latter, it is reified
as an omnipotent, essentially malevolent Leviathan (Matza 1969). These
monolithic formulations leave little room for resistance or self-determi- nation
collective or individual on the part of those who are controlled.
We agree with the critics about the ahistorical, determinist character of the 'social
control' model. Indeed, when placed in context, both the benign and coercive
definitions of social control are clearly linked to specific configurations of
social conditions that promoted their ascendancy at particular points in time.
Thus, Ross's concept of social control was the result of his attempts to confront
and explain the extensive social change that was sweeping the United States and
other Western market societies in the late nineteenth century. A coalescence of
political, economic and demographic lines of development namely, urbanization,
industrialization and universal suffrage during the period from the 1880s to the
1930s created the foundations of the welfare state (Garland 1981, 1985, Hall 1984).
In America, the upheaval wrought by these changes was exacerbated by the influx
of numerous ethnic, religious and national groups from Europe as well as massive
internal migration from farms to cities.
While Durkheim was describing the movement from mechanical to organic
solidarity, then, Ross (1969) was simultaneouslydiscussing the shift from natural,
undifferentiated
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property and free enterprise; the growth of impersonal and transient urban

relationships; and a high degree of occupational mobility, deterioration of marriage,
kinship and religious traditions and technological change (Ross 1969; see also
Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974: 204-211). 'Social con- trol' emerged as the
pivotal concept in a reformulation of liberalism which accompanied the
ideological shift from an emphasis on individualism and the minimal state
characteristic of the classical laissez-faire state to a focus on individualization
and the interventionist state characteristic of the social welfare state (Garland 1985).
Ross perceived the United States in ideal-type terms as a 'classless' or 'democractic'
form of society where 'social control' would ultimately replace class conflict and
class control (Ross 1969: 376-395).
As a quintessential Progressive, Ross did not believe that capitalism and social
classes could or should be eliminated but he was convinced that the rough edges
could be smoothed off and disruptive conflicts between individuals and groups
eliminated. In addition to the state functioning as the in- stitutional arena for
conflict resolution, Ross also envisaged other kinds of relationships which would
prevent selfish interest groups from dominating differentiated societies (ibid).
Thus, although capitalists were strong, counter- vailing forces of 'public opinion',
tradition and enlightened politicians(for example, Theodore Roosevelt) would
maintain a balance. Ross and his 'progressive' successors, then, formulated a
concept of 'social control' premised on assumptions about harmony, cooperation and
progress. As the benign concept of 'social control' worked its way into the work of
the pre-WWII functionalists and from there into modern American sociological
thought (Hunt 1978: 19), it increasingly came to mean the 'scientific management'
of people by technocrats and experts. Confident of their ability to 'do good',
psychologists, social workers and other professionals provided assistance in the
mobilization of various resources for the production of conformity.

However, the coercive version of 'social control', which made its debut in the
1960s and was refined during the 1970s, strongly challenged the conventional
assumption that informal social controls were the fundamental basis, or essence of
social order. Like its benign counterpart, the repressive model of 'social control'
emerged within the context of particular historical conditions. Some contemporary
analysts (Scull 1977, Cohen 1985) argue that another fundamental restructuring
of Western market societies is in progress. While this has not yet been
demonstrated unequivocally, it can definitely be established that a widespread
perception of 'crisis' -fiscal, political, legal -in liberal democracies formed the
backdrop for the reconceptualization of 'social control' (Unger 1976, Scull 1977,
Hall et al. 1978,Janowitz 1978). Indeed, radical criminologists, sociologists and
historians not only brought 'control', in the sense of repressive state control, to
centre stage but also called for forms of political practice linked to such a
conception (Garland and Young 1983: 6).
Unfortunately, the radical promise of these 'social control' theorists has not been
realized. Their critique remains underdeveloped; in radical analyses, 'control'
remains a 'vague force' and revolutionary politics have been confined almost
exclusively 'to the written page or conducted in abstract' (ibid). In some ways, then,
the coercive formulation of 'social control' does not represent an advance over the
traditional theorizing about it. As Garland has suggested in another context, 'A
philosophical inversion is not in itself a theoretical ad- vance' (1983: 50). Thus, the

presumed critical function of the coercive model of 'social control' can be seriously
questioned.
At the same time, although no 'systematic accounts' of 'control' have been
produced, radical theorists tend to assume that any 'control' is in and of itself bad or

unjust. Such an assumption has led to what Adlam and Rose (1981) call the 'tedious
repetition' of 'unmaskings' of the social control functions of psychiatry, medicine,
social policy and the welfare state, as well as the criminal law. This denunciation of
the state and all its works is not radical, however, because everything and therefore
nothing can count as an instance of repressive social control (ibid). The controlled,
then, are passive robots at the mercy of a carceral apparatus which expands almost
daily. But to what extent do people voluntarily participate in their own
subjugation? To what degree do they receive genuine assistance from the people
who presumably control them? To what extent do individuals and groups resist
efforts to repress them? These are questions which we believe cannot be addressed
within the con- straints of a 'social control' model.

Law as social control: obvious or obfuscation?

The limitations of the 'social control' model become more apparent when the
implications of its coupling with law are examined. Yet, despite (or perhaps
because of) the frequent use in the literature of the law and social control
couplet, which is enjoying a certain renaissancein both criminology and
sociology of law, in literature of both critical (see, e.g., Greenaway and Brickey
1978, Hamner 1981, Scull and Cohen 1983, Ratner and McMullen 1985, Snider
1985, Boyd 1986) and non-critical literature alike (see, e.g., Black 1978, Hagan et al.
1979, Yago 1981, Gibbs 1982), what is curious is the absence of any serious
interrogation of this pairing. It seems that the social reality of law, its raison d'etre,
is pure, simple and obvious: it is an instrument of (social) control. And yet, its
appeal is precisely the trap: because of its 'somewhat self-evident character there

has been insufficient attention to the implications that flow from the "law as social
control" perspective' (Hunt 1978: 146).
In the non-critical socio-legal literature, resort to the formal social control of law is
said to be had when informal methods of control are no longer available or capable
of producing acquiescence. The formal shores up or enforces the values of the
informal. The baldest (if admittedly least critical) restatement of law as social
control is found in the work of Donald Black (1976; 1978). Social control is the
'normative aspect of social life . . . which defines and responds to deviant behaviour'
(1978: 105); Black defines (rather than locates) law as 'governmental social

control' (1978: 2). He eschews a jurisprudential approach to the sociology of law:
law is simply 'behaviour', a quantifiable, measurable variable:

The quantity of law varies in time and space. It varies across centuries,
decades and years, months and days, even the hours of the day. It varies across
societies, regions, communities, neighborhoods, families, and rela- tionships of
every kind. Itvaries across the world and its history, the settings of a society or
community, the cases in a court, the daily round of a policeman(1978: 3-4).

Black's conception of law as social control is not particularly innovative and can
be characterized as an updated restatement of Durkheim (Menzies 1983); however,
it is important because of its influence in sociology of law and in criminology.
But beyond that, Black's work both exemplifies and illustrates the weakness of the
perspective: law is exclusively bound up with the notion of sanctioning 'deviant
behaviour' and it explicitly denies the importance of historical specificity. In his
sociology of law, the formal social control of law is a natural and inevitable

consequence of social life:

The constraint of society over its members is thus the constraint that flows
naturally from the primary constituents of social life itself. The constraint that is
exercised through the informal mechanisms of social control is seen as being
essentially a process of self-regulation endemic in the postulation of social life
itself . Now, if law is regarded as one of the forms of social control there is implied
a view that they form a continuum ranged along a scale from informal means to the
more institutionalised forms of which law is regarded as the most specialised
form (Hunt 1976: 27-28).

This notion of a continuum between informal and formal is not confined to the noncritical literature in the sociology of law. Indeed, the radical social control literature
evinces the same commitment, although the formal enforcement of informal
relations is given a coercive edge. However, within this literature, even the
apparent retreat from formality is seen to be a trick, or as Maureen Cain has
observed, 'a disguised form of state expansion' (1985: 339).
The commitment of radical social theorists to a conception of social control is
puzzling. As we have argued above, one is bound to ask what is social about the
control of law and how are we to identify its manifestations? Is all law
committed to social control? What is the role of the state? Of ideology?
Admittedly these are questions not even posed by the mainstream writers.
However, if the answers to these questions seem obvious to some, it is, we would
argue, because critical scholars have not been inclined to seriously interrogate
the social reality of law in different historical contexts, but rather have been

content to apply a priori theories to the place of law.
Despite its powerful challenge to the hegemony of jurisprudence in the
sociology of law (see Hunt 1976, 1978), one must query the analytical utility of
conceptualizing law as simply a form of 'social control', with or without a
coercive edge. How, if at all, can it facilitate our understanding of resistance,
struggle and social change? Can it help us understand the nature and significancein
shifts in both the position and the role, as well as the content, of law in different
historical contexts (see Hall et al. 1978, Hall 1980, Smart 1984)? As Gareth Stedman
Jones has argued:

There is no political or ideological institution which could not in some way be
interpreted as an agency of social control. There is no indication in the phrase of
who the agents or instigators of social control may be: no in- dication of any
common mechanism whereby social control is enforced: no constant criterion
whereby we may judge whether social control has broken down . . . (1977: 164).

In its narrow emphasis on the sanctioning of deviance by the imposition of
controls, the possibility of understanding whole social formations and whole legal
systems the totality rather than a segment is neglected (Sugarman 1983: 214). This
then highlights yet another problematic aspect of the 'law as social control'
perspective: the focus is invariably upon criminal law, penal law, and forms of
administrative law such as welfare and mental health law, and the emphasis is upon
the manipulative, 'containing' aspects of that law. Just as Hunt (1982) has
criticized the coercion-consent dichotomy within sociology of law, so too it is
clear that within both the 'benign' and 'critical' social control perspectives the
dichotomy is reinforced with different emphasis: the law either controls or coerces -

the result is the same: the targeting of a problem population for control.
As we have suggested above, the concept has been employed in radical
critiques of law to attempt to expose and demystify liberal and legislative
reforms and policies (of which there are fewer and fewer in the current context).
As a result, the work of critical 'social control' theorists must be located at the
'instrumentalist' level of marxist theorizing on law (see Hunt 1981a), adopting
(albeitly implicitly) a rejection of law as a (useful) site of struggle, coupled with a
desire to unmask the dark side of the legal reform.
Hunt himself does not address the 'critical' social control literature; however, we
would argue that it finds its place in his conceptualization of 'instrumentalist'
theorizing on law. This is important, because although Hunt cogently argues that
within the 'law as social control' perspective there is a tendency to neglect the
coercive character of law (1976: 28, 1978: 147, 1981a: 96), it is clear that within the
radical/critical social control literature there is identifieda thinly masked coercive
edge to the thrust of 'legal control'.

Formal and informal control

Within the 'law as social control perspective', there is identified a particular
relationship with 'informal' control. The formal control of law is juxtaposed with
informal social controls and the relationship is unequivocal: law varies inversely
with other social controls (Black 1978, Hagan et al. 1979). The position
advanced is that men are controlled by formal controls and women are controlled by
informal controls (specifically the 'informal control process of childcare': Hagan et
al. 1979: 27) -the model presents 'functional alternatives' and purports to explain the

apparently differential sanctioning of conduct of men and women (see Barrett 1980:
236). And although the 'invisibility' of men and women in the private and public
realms respectively is acknowledged (Hagan et al. 1979: 27), the ideological
dimensions of this neat, static bifurcation of the world, and its coercive
implications, are not interrogated.
This emphasis on formal and informal neither apprehends nor addresses the
ideological character of the processes of the state and the law. It reproduces an
image of society in which there is both a simple bifurcation between formal and
informal and an implied continuum between the two (Hunt 1976, 1978): a
reinforcement of the informal by the formal. To divide society unproblematically
into two realms the formal and informal (or the public and the private) -is to
neglect the ideological nature of these two 'discrete' realms and to ignore the nature
of the relationship between the two. Indeed, insofar as it contributes to the notion
that the 'formal' law either does not or ought not intrude into the ordinary and
everyday workings of a smoothly running informal sphere, it distorts (and directs
attention away from) the nature of the law's contribution to the construction of
the 'public' and 'private' spheres. To put it at its simplest, one cannot opt out of the
law and seek refuge in the invisibility and sanctuary of the 'informal' realm: as
Julia Brophy and Carol Smart have argued, 'the law still has something [indeed
much] to say about our domestic lives and intimate relations and we cannot assert
its irrelevance by ignoring it' (1985: 1). The nature and social significance of
'informal' relationships may change; indeed, legislative initiatives of the 1970s in
Canadian family law and the amended, expanded definitions of 'spouse' for the
purpose of maintenance and child support, but significantly not property, bestowed
a legal status upon previously 'subterranean' relationships. 4 The 'family' is still
defined by law, and notwithstanding gender neutral references to 'spouses' and

'parent', it is still taken to mean male adult, female adult , and their biological or
adopted children.
Feminists have identified the importance of the 'private sphere' and, at the same
time, the essentially ideological nature of a reified split between the public and
the private. For instance, while Tove Stang Dahl and Annika Snare (1978) identify the
importance of the 'informal' control of women, in particular the male-dominated
family household, their analysis expressly addresses the coercive nature of the
'informal' or 'private' sphere, with conflicting interests between wife and husband,
and the 'status quo' effect of its invisibility (1978: 22). Further, they explicitly
identify the role of the state in constructing and supporting the home as a private
prison for women. As Michele Barrett has observed, 'This argument relies on a
recognition of the role of the state in maintaining the myth of a separation of the
public from the private sphere, according to which women are held to occupy a
privileged (albeit at the same time restricted) place in the private arena' (1980: 23940). Gender becomes not simply a variable in 'sexual stratification': gender

relations are social relations that are socially constructed, the subject and site of
struggle, and in most social contexts the locus of the oppression of women.

Law and the social control of women

Renee Kasinsky's (1978) analysis of rape and the social control of women is
illustrative of the instrumental and coercive emphasis of the critical social control
perspective, as applied to women:

In addition to controlling and psychologically assaulting the rape victim, the law

and legal practices also exert social control over the entire female population
through the wide fear of rape. The law and court processes help legitimize the
assailants' actions through the lack of prosecution. Women soon learn that they
cannot rely upon the authority of the State, controlled by male interests, to
protect themselves from rape (1978: 63).

In feminist accounts of social control, the 'social' is really 'male' and the

'control' emanates from the law, legal practices, the state all controlled by 'male
interests' (see also Hanmer 1981). The 'social control' of women is thus achieved by
the direct and instrumental manipulation of the law and the state by male interests
(see also MacKinnon 1983).
As others have argued (see e.g. Petchesky 1984, Brophy and Smart 1985) there
are both theoretical and practical limitations to this approach to law. In arguing that
the law and the state represent the interests of men as a group, one is hard-pressed to
offer a coherent explanation for changes in the law which have not resulted from
'male' pressure nor witnessed benefits for 'men' as a whole (for example, the repeal
of spousal immunity in sexual assault legislation in Canada). Implicit as well in
this position is the notion that 'male interests' may be understood to be
unproblematically monolithic (Smart 1984) a position which is rich in polemics but
will not withstand serious scrutiny, particularly if class, race and ethnicity are
considered.
An insistence on both historical specificity and the importance of the role of law in
'organizing' consent is a recent theme in socio-legal research (see, e.g. , Hay 1975,
Thompson 1975, Hall et al. 1978, Hall 1980). These issues are no less important for an
understanding of the nature of the law's contribution to the oppression of women.
And while the gaze must be broad, the focus must be precise. For instance, the

reformist legislation of two periods of the post-war British state in the area of
morality has been carefully analyzed. These legislative initiatives, which crossed the
civil/criminal boundaries of legal classification, dealt, inter alia, with prostitution,
suicide, obscenity in the first period (1950s)and with abortion, contraception,
homosexuality and divorce in the later period (1960s) (Hall 1980). The thrust of the
legislative reforms has often been characterized as one of liberalization and
permissiveness (cf . Greenwood and Young 1980), although as Hall illustrates, the
core of the tendency of the legislation was increased state regulation coupled with
selective privatization (1980: 18). Although he examines the limited nature of some of
the reforms, he cautions against posing the issue in 'too simple and binary a form'
that is, viewing them as a tightening of control under the veneer of reform (1980:
18). The message of the legislation was directed toward the regulation of morality:
'that is, inevitably it was about sexual practice' (1980: 20). The target of the
'message' was not simply the 'problem' population directly affected by the
legislation (for example, homosexual men, consumers of sexual services, obscene
literature and so on); rather, Hall argues, the principal object/subject of the
legislation was the position of women -a reshaping of the field of female sexual
conduct (see also Smart 1981). Rather than identifying simply the limits of reform,
Hall insists that the issue must be approached with a more theoretically informed
perspective:

This attempt to reshape the field of female sexual conduct must be set in the
context of other practices and discourses concerning women in the period, and
against the material conditions affecting their position (1980: 21).

The two periods witnessed somewhat different thrusts, the legislation of the 1950s
being involved in the more general ideological campaign –characterized by the
'reconstruction of femininity' (1980: 21) -to return women to the home, marriage and
family. The economic policy and planning of the British state promoted, and was
thought to depend upon, consumption within the 'private and familial sphere' and
'women had to be located at the heart and centre of the principal unit of
consumption, the family' (1980: 23). In the 1960s, the combined effect of the
growing women's movement and wider access to abortion and contraception
facilitated the 'partial break' with the domestic ideal of the 1950s.
If one is committed to developing a coherent explanation of the impact and

significance of this constellation of legislation which attempted to reconstruct sexual
practices, it is clear that the 'law as social control' couplet is too blunt and imprecise
an analytical instrument to detail the full social significance thereof . It can be
argued , for instance, that the 'named' targets of individual pieces of legislation were
not necessarily those most affected; nor is it tenable to argue that the net effect of
the 'restructuring' of the field of female sexual practice was simply the widening of
the net of control over women's sexuality (although a strong argument can be made
with respect to the punitive control of prostitutes see Smart 1981), because some of
the legislation gave women some room to manoeuvre, either directly as in
abortion law reform (cf . Mackinnon 1983) or indirectly as in the case of divorce
law reform. The sustained support of the British state in the post-war period for a
particular model of family household and familial ideology (through social policy
and legislative initiatives) was far more problematic for women (see Mcintosh
1978, Barrett 1980, Taylor 1981).
When applied to women then, the 'law as social control' perspective neglects this
important insight that the position and importance of law shifts in different historical

contexts (Hall 1980). These shifts are neither simply nor easily imposed from
'above' but may be forced from 'below' through resistance, opposition and
struggle (see, for example, Linebaugh 1975). This is as true of women's struggles and
resistance as it is for other social groups. To understand the significance of different
forms of struggle one requires, as Stuart Hall and his colleagues have argued , a
'more differentiated historically located analysis':

In such a perspective, it is precisely the whole repertoire of struggle strategies,
positions, solutions which must inform the analysis, and which throws a revealing
light back onto those sections of the [working] class taking or driven along the
specific path of 'criminalisation' (1978: 188).

Changes in legal definitions and categories of crime, or indeed in legal reforms
generally, must be understood within the context of struggle not simply as
concessions

granted

voluntarily,

benevolently

or

with

'manipulation

aforethought'. This is as important for an understanding of the nature of and
significance of class struggle historically as it is for an understanding of the
historical contexts of women's struggles for equality at law.
In nineteenth and early twentieth-century England, the development of the notion
of the importance of mothers to young children, and indeed the ideology of
motherhood (see Davin 1978) was inextricably bound up with a long struggle by
women to challenge the bald patriarchal principles of the English law of husband
and wife (see Brophy and Smart 1981), which had long held that the children of a
marriage were the children of the father. In this century, the ideology of
'motherhood' has reinforced the notion that woman's proper place is in the home
and that her secondary position is in the work force. Still, some ground in real

terms was gained by women within the family by virtue of the 'privileging' of
women's/mothers' importance to children (in the best interests of the children).
Similarly, Smart's (1984) analysis illuminates the shifting terrain of law, and shows
that in different social contexts, the meaning and impact of the same piece of
legislation may be profoundly contradictory as in the case of matrimonial
property law in the late nineteenth century, when legislation for the first time
provided for the ownership of separate property by married women, to the 1950s,
when courts interpreted the right to own separate property to mean an ability to
make equal contributions to acquisition of property. Thus the principle of
formal equality enshrined in the nineteenth-century legislation was used by
twentieth-century courts against married women unable to demonstrate any real
(financial) contribution to the family home.
Clearly, the social position of women is intimately connected with regulation
by the state: even pregnancy and childbirth are closely regulated as
demonstrated by the struggle around midwifery and homebirths. To ignore the
'formal' or to too narrowly define it is to miss completely the myriad complex and
contradictory ways in which the state ensures and reproduces women's
subordination. However, as Mary Mcintosh (1981) reminds us, in the current
context neither socialists nor feminists can afford 'the luxury of a purely critical
stance' vis-a-vis the state. This is particularly appropriate in the context of
conservative governments' targeting such parts of the 'control apparatus' as
welfare, education and health care all of which have been key arenas for
women's employment since the second world war (see Armstrong 1984).
Women have much to lose when the 'control apparatus' is attacked. Indeed, as
Rosalind Petchesky has argued, 'the "gatekeepers" to reproductive services are
more often women, who as counselors, nurses, physicians, and agency

bureaucrats mediate state reproductive policies sometimes progressively'
(emphasis in original (1984: 67). Clearly the locus-if one can be identified -of the
'control' of women is neither primarily 'informal' nor totally determined by a
monolithic (male or capitalist) state.

Conclusion

In this paper we have undertaken what we regard as a preliminary critiq ue of the
concept of 'social control' and its utility for a critical criminology in Canada. In
tracing its emergence and historical development as a key concept in American
sociology, we have illustrated that its ascendancy represented a victory for liberal
sociology. The recent attempts by critical criminologists and sociologists to
rehabilitate the concept of 'social control' by insisting upon the essentially coercive
nature of control have not resulted in an advance over traditional theorizing.
By examining the 'women, law and social control' literature, in particular the use
of the 'formal/informal' dichotomy, we have attempted to illustrate the limited utility
of the concept for developing an historically and theoretically informed
understanding of the complex and contradictory relationship of women to the state
and law. The concept of 'social control' is ahistorical: when coupled with law,
moreover, it lends itself to instrumentalism. It is our view that the concept of 'social
control' ought to be abandoned by critical scholars in favour of one attentive to the
dynamic complexity of history, struggle and change.
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Notes
1. See, for example, how the concept of social control is employed in: Greenaway and Brickey (1978),
Hanmer (1981), Cohen and Scull (1983), Anderson and Davis (1983), Schur (1984), Boyd (1986),
Menzies, Lowman and Palys (1987).
2. The concept of 'social control' is, of course, inextricably bound up with the equally problematic concept
of 'deviance' (Sumner 1983).
3. Although we are concerned with sociological conceptions of 'social control', it should be noted that nonsociological formulations have also been extremely influential, both in the past and at the present point
in time (Zimring and Hawkins1973).
4. The Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, s. 1, defines spouse as a wife or a husband and includes
(c) except under Part 3, a man or woman not married to each other, who lived as husband
and wife for a period of not Jess than 2 years, where an application under this Act is made by one
of them against the other not more than one year after the date they ceased living together as
husband and wife.
This expanded definition of spouse is excepted under the important Part 3 of the legislation which

pertains to family property and assets; for the purpose of property ownership, the spouse must be a 'legal'
spouse.
The Ontario legislation is similar; however, 'spouse' is more narrowly defined in the defini- tion
section to mean either of a man and woman who 'are married to each other' or 'who have entered into
a marriage that is voidable or void in good faith on the part of the person asserting a right under this
Act'. ( Family Law Act, S.O., 1986, c. 4, as amended by 1986, c. 5, s. 1(1)). The expanded definition of
'spouse' is contained only in the part of the Act which relates specifically to support obligations; s. 29
defines a spouse as follows:
29. In this Part,
'spouse' means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition includes either of a man and
woman not being married to each other and have cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not Jess than three years, or
(b) in a relationship of some permanence if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.
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